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 Nuclear arms have revolutionized the ways by which human beings are able to 
harm one another.  Omnipresent in the status quo is a nuclear tension, and whether subtly 
or more overtly, this tension underlies a great many international relationships. While 
Westphalian paranoia and neorealist power perceptions encourage populations to 
continue placing their faith in nuclear umbrellas and deterrence strategies, scholars and 
activists increasingly claim that without the realization of universal disarmament, 
humanity concedes to the inevitability of future nuclear detonation.  
 New disarmament initiatives concentrate heavily on the implications of nuclear 
weaponry in a sense that supersedes the security of only particular sovereign populations. 
Not only are we witnessing a pivot toward a more holistic devotion to the global good, 
but we are also seeing increased normative attacks on nuclear legitimacy, as well as a 
transition toward international collective security architecture.  
The following research utilizes a qualitative, interview-based model and will 
discuss disarmament initiatives with a particular concentration on the influence of 
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“Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of 
annihilation.” – Winston Churchill1 
 
We no longer live in the immediate wake of World War II, nor is the Red Scare 
any longer at the forefront of our minds. However, the implications of nuclear weapon 
technologies are just as vitally important today as they were in the world’s not-so-distant 
past. As nuclear weapon technologies have evolved over the past seventy or so years, so 
have the justifications for their continued possession. Little Boy and Fat Man laid the 
cornerstone on which perceptions of nuclear technologies would forever be built. They 
were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, under very 
particular circumstances that American leadership at the time deemed necessitated such 
devastation. Likewise, the colossal arms race between the United States and U.S.S.R. was 
hinged on strategic circumstance. Threat perceptions born of the devastating nature of 
these weapons motivated decades of paranoia, subsequently resulting in massive 
armament campaigns. While these weapons have remained more or less dormant in their 
silos, submarines, and elsewhere for quite some time, the paradox of their continued 
existence is still at the heart of international security policy.  
Deterrence theory, to which Winston Churchill referred in 1955, continues to 
dominate international security strategies.  It is contingent on the comparability of 
nuclear strike capabilities between states. In other words, so long as any nuclear first 
                                                        
1 Winston Churchill’s “Never Despair” speech to the House of Commons on March 1, 1955. 
 6 
strike would receive a response of equal or greater magnitude, there is no strategic 
incentive for the initial strike to occur. Of course, this is a gross simplification of the 
theory itself, but it helps to illustrate the origin of the paradigm of “mutually assured 
destruction” (MAD) that deterrence theorists tout as being responsible for the lack of 
direct, major power conflict since World War II. Nuclear weapon proponents tool 
deterrence theory to “manipulate the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons for public 
diplomacy, while falling back on “realist sense” that “we can’t put the genie back into the 
bottle” to justify keeping and modernizing their arsenals from one generation to the next. 
By dint of constant repetition of “truisms” like this, they foster the belief that nuclear 
disarmament is impossible.”2  
Increasingly in the status quo is deterrence theory coming under fire. Scholars and 
activists are scrutinizing the theory, attempting to discern whether it has any scientific 
backing whatsoever. Of course, the answers to this question are mixed. The majority of 
neorealist advocates of nuclear weapon possession reference the empirics of recent 
history as proof enough that the technologies are stable and that deterrence theory is 
functioning properly. Nuclear-armed states gravitate toward these claims, and continue to 
modernize and develop current technologies.3 However, as the world continues to 
civilize, anti-nuclear weapon activists claim that there are a multitude of alternative 
causalities to the lack of major power conflict that we have witnessed since World War 
II. They proceed to argue that, in reference to Winston Churchill’s 1955 remarks, it is the 
ultimate irresponsibility to remain hostages of terror and annihilation, for we are tempting 
fate with each day that we place our lives in the hands of death itself.  
                                                        
2 Johnson, “The NPT in 2010-2012: A Control Regime Trapped in Time.” 
3 Acheson, “Modernization of Nuclear Weapons: Aspiring to ‘Indefinite Retention’?” 
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Particularly after the public release of multiple “near miss” summaries from the 
Cold War, populations are mobilizing in opposition of nuclear weapons technologies. 
The lack of absolute human predictability and the simple fact that we as a species are not 
immune to mistakes proves the necessity of disarmament. The very creation of nuclear 
weapon technologies is a testament to the imperfections of humanity, and these 
imperfections, sooner or later, will assuredly manifest in an error that could cost us the 
world. The post-Cold War “calm” that is perceived by many in the status quo is no less 
than a façade; “the threat posed by nuclear weapons today remains at least as great as it 
was before 1989.”4 
While disarmament advocates and civil societies are in tireless pursuit of a 
nuclear weapon-free world, progress is at a standstill. This standstill largely results from 
the very paradox of deterrence theory itself. Peace is only “guaranteed” by deterrence 
theory when all nuclear-armed sides possess comparable strike and defense capabilities. 
Thus, if one player’s capabilities are ever disadvantaged, a first strike against said player 
would no longer be disincentivized. As no nuclear weapon state is willing to risk such a 
breach in security, deterrence advocates often explain that states must disarm in a 
perfectly synchronized and simultaneous manner, or not at all. “’enforcement’ [for such a 
process] remains a critical, underdeveloped issue.”5 The logistical barriers alone make it 
nigh impossible, in addition to the simple fact that nuclear weapon posturing remains 
highly classified in all nuclear weapon states. The degree of transparency necessary as a 
                                                        
4 Williams, “Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament.” 
5 Koplow, “You’re Gonna Need a Bigger Boat: Alternatives to the U.N. Security Council for 
Enforcing Nuclear Disarmament and Human Rights” 
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prerequisite to the pursuit of synchronized disarmament could inadvertently advantage 
some countries over others in such ways as to break the efficacy of deterrence theory.  
 Simply put, neorealists and nuclear advocates would adamantly have us believe 
that the paradoxical nature of the technology, deterrence theory, and disarmament 
requirements ensure that disarmament itself is genuinely impossible.  
Gridlock and standstill remain dominant characteristics of nuclear disarmament in 
our status quo, but is disarmament as an end state truly as impossible as naysayers would 
have the world believe? The discussion herein will attempt to shed light on an ongoing 
process that could subvert the perceived necessity of nuclear weapon technologies: 
globalization. In other words, is the process of globalization chipping away at status quo 
conceptions of security, legitimacy, and nationality in such ways as to make possible 
universal disarmament of nuclear weaponry?  
While “globalization” is a term often rooted in economic discourse more so than 
elsewhere, its implications on the international community are farther reaching than one 
would suppose. As the world continues to globalize, we may begin to witness an 
unprecedented shift away from traditional neorealist framing of international relations in 
an exclusively power-centric way. New factors including the evolution of transnational or 
“world” cultures, the establishment of new international norms relating to nuclear 
technologies, and the collectivization of security architecture could become focal to the 
disarmament debate in the coming years. As globalization facilitates the evolution of 




 Relevant publications to the nuclear disarmament debate are innumerable. The 
topic itself is expansive, and often cannot be comprehensively understood without 
evaluating a whole slew of literature on intimately related and interconnected debates. 
The neorealist school of thought from which contemporary power politics are generally 
borne saw its genesis in the writings of Kenneth Waltz, particularly “Theory of 
International Politics.” The fundamental characteristics of power-centric international 
political strategies outlined by the neorealist school are foundational to phenomena of 
arms races, and to explaining why disarmament is so strategically suicidal.  
 Deterrence theory has developed as complimentary to the neorealist framing of 
international relations. While not necessarily the first to discuss deterrence theory, 
Thomas Schelling’s works “The Strategy of Conflict” in 1960 and “Arms and Influence” 
in 1966 are foundational to North American deterrence strategy, and subsequently 
promote the continued possession of nuclear weapons out of strategic necessity. 
 In competition with these works (and others coming from predominantly North 
American security institutions like the RAND Institute) are schools devoted more so to 
international humanitarian law, disarmament movements, and globalization analysis. 
Henry Dunant’s “A Memory of Solferino” is one of the first works on humanitarian law, 
and helped to inspire the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross. To 
this day, the organization produces IHL analyses that shape contemporary conflict 
legitimacy considerations.  
 Numerous organizations around the world contribute to the pro-disarmament 
discussion, among them is the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. This 
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organization helped to bring to fruition successes on the disarmament of both cluster 
munitions and landmines (with the aid of many other actors). The Geneva Centre for 
Security Policy, Acronym Institute, Foundation for Strategic Research, Center for 
Security Studies, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and 
International Peace Bureau are but a few of many other international and 
nongovernmental organizations and think tanks who lend a voice to disarmament 
analysis, sometimes on both sides of the debate. 
 While globalization, much like disarmament, is a massively loaded term, 
intricately related to other fields of discussion, John Tomlinson’s “Globalization and 
Culture,” and Cees J. Hamelink’s “The Elusive Concept of Globalisation” are important 
points of reference on questions of globalization holistically, as well as on more refined 
curiosities related to cultural homogenization and transnational cultural identity.  
 The Ottawa Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) are 
important points of reference regarding the discussion of international norm-building and 
legitimacy-questioning campaigns. Additionally important to this discussion is a work by 
Adam Hochschild called “Bury the Chains.” This work draws parallels between the 
evolution of international slave trade legitimacy, and disarmament movements. 
Hochschild discusses the establishment of “logics of appropriateness” necessary to 
realizing social successes in up-hill political battles. 
 Finally, Dr. Marc Finaud’s work on cooperative security, “Cooperative Security: 
A New Paradigm for a World Without Nuclear Weapons,” outlines many foundational 
necessities of a collective framework, strengthened by globalization, that could usher in a 
new era of security architecture. 
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Research Methodology 
Qualitative research shall comprise the core of this work. While quantitative data 
analysis is important to understandings of nuclear arsenals, capabilities, and many of the 
implications of globalization on global markets and international relations more 
generally, the primary focus herein is on attitudinal and behavioral aspects of the 
disarmament discussion. The belief systems on which status quo societies base the 
necessity of nuclear weapons are key aspects of this discussion. Additionally important 
are the cultural threads within the relational web of this technology. Culture is 
exceedingly difficult to quantify and, particularly in a globalizing world, cultural 
evolution is difficult to predict. Much like the norms and questions of appropriateness 
that shall soon be discussed herein, it is nigh impossible to study these entities and 
processes on a tangible level; only their effects are visible.6 Thus, qualitative research and 
predictions are the only tools available for conducting research along this particular vein.  
Primary data (interviews) shall provide a substantial basis for the conclusions 
found herein. Interviewees have been chosen from varied sides of the disarmament 
debate, bringing with them a diversity of opinions that shall soon be discussed. Primarily 
representing international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, and 
other scholarly and educational institutions, the interviewees both individually and 
collectively possess immense academic prestige. 
While the interviewees selected do not overtly belong to sensitive populations, 
ethical considerations played a substantial role in both the recruitment and interview 
processes. Ensuring that the well-being of these individuals is comprehensively ensured 
                                                        
6 Interview with Dr. John Borrie of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 
Thursday, November 5, 2015. 
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has been an absolute priority throughout research and writing. Steps were taken to ensure 
ethical treatment of scholars, including a full disclosure of interview use, and requests to 
use stated information (quotations) in the various ways seen in this work. In some cases, 
quotation review prior to use was requested, and of course, granted. Scholars were 
contacted on an individual basis, with no external influence that could compromise the 
freewill of the scholar his/herself. Selection of scholars was largely based on field of 
study and relevant expertise. No forms of compensation were provided to the 
interviewees, nor were any of their respective colleagues, organizations, or other third 
parties involved in the process. Thus, no inappropriate external factors acted coercively in 
motivating participation. Lack of anonymity did not concern any interviewees, thus 




Cooperative Security: Cooperative security shall be defined as “a process whereby 
countries with common interests work jointly through agreed mechanisms to reduce 
tensions and suspicion, resolve or mitigate disputes, build confidence, enhance economic 
development prospects, and maintain stability in their regions.”7 
Cultural Homogenization: Cultural homogenization shall be defined as a process by 
which traditional conceptions of nationalism and citizenship become less relevant. 
Transnational identity or citizenship is included within this homogenization. The 
theoretical end state of this homogenization is universal “global” or “world citizenship.”8 
Disarmament: For the purposes of this paper, disarmament shall be used to describe an 
end state, and shall be used in reference to nuclear weapon technologies. “As an end 
state, disarmament involves eventually establishing a disarmed world.”9  
Globalization: Globalization shall be defined as: “economic integration; the transfer of 
policies across borders; the transmission of knowledge; cultural stability; the 
reproduction, relations, and discourses of power; it is a global process, a concept, a 
revolution, and ‘an establishment of the global market free from sociopolitical 
control.’10”11 
                                                        
7 Finaud, “Cooperative Security: A New Paradigm for a World Without Nuclear Weapons?” 
8 Gellner, “Nations and Nationalism: New Perpsectives on the Past.” 
9 Borrie and Caughley, “How are Humanitarian Approaches Relevant to Achieving Progress on 
Nuclear Disarmament?” p 35. 
10 Nikitin, Elliott, “Freedom and the Market (An Analysis of the Anti-globalisation Movement 
from the Perspective of the Theoretical Foundation of the Evaluation of the Dynamics of 
Capitalism by Palanyi, Hayek and Keynes)” p. 3. 
11 Al-Rodhan, Stoudmann “Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a 





International Norm: An international norm shall be defined as a majority acceptance of 
a particular tangible or intangible behavior. The unit of analysis contributing to the 
“majority” and “minority” evaluations herein shall focus primarily on internationally 











 Systems of sovereignty born of the Westphalian order provide the basis for inter-
state interaction in the status quo, and the “national identities” that result play “an under-
acknowledged part in nuclear decision-making.”12 The obligation of sovereign states to 
secure their respective citizenries exists today in much the same way that it has passively 
existed since the advent of sovereignty. Today, however, lines are beginning to blur ever 
so slightly. Is a state exclusively obligated to protect and secure only its own citizenry, or 
does its obligation extend to larger world priorities? Should people look to the sovereign 
state of which they are citizens solely for the protection of their own, or should they 
expect and demand global protections that know no geopolitical boundary? More so in 
the status quo than ever before in history, globalization is prompting these extrospective 
inquiries, and national and cultural identities are becoming less explicit.  
While “Globalization is often considered in economic terms […] it also 
encompasses technological, political and cultural change.”13 The cultural and political 
aspects of this globalization-prompted change are exceedingly important to the future of 
nuclear disarmament initiatives.  Status quo nuclear culture is dominated by realist and 
neorealist power perceptions. These are the driving force behind deterrence theory and 
strive to convince populations of the necessity of nuclear weapon technologies for the 
                                                        
12 Johnson, “The NPT in 2010-2012: A Control Regime Trapped in Time.” 




realization of securitization priorities, all based on relative power disparities between 
sovereign states.  They perpetuate the “us” versus “them” nationalistic and cultural 
rhetoric on which weaponization has always been based. Stone, spear, sword, bow, gun, 
tank, nuclear bomb; despite variation in complexity, these are all means to the same end.  
The creation of these weapons, as many realist theorists will explain, is 
unidirectional. “We, scientists, humanity, know the destructiveness of nuclear weapons 
and how to produce them. They cannot be un-invented.”14 Disarmament naysayers will 
persistently cite this uni-directionality as proof enough the disarmament can never be 
achieved. They claim that there will always be a cheater; there will always be someone 
who threatens development, thus locking the world in a perpetual paranoia that ensures 
continued investment in deterrence infrastructure. The nuclear box has been opened, they 
say, and it will never close.  
However, these arguments against the feasibility of disarmament assume not only 
uni-directionality of invention, but also culture as a constant rather than a variable. This is 
where globalization becomes oh so relevant to the discussion. According to Dr. Goran 
Jovanovic of the International Institute of Geneva, “if you start to manufacture a stick, a 
sword, a rifle, or a nuclear device it is because you have an image of the enemy in your 
mind. What if you did not have this image? The weapons we have created are not so 
much the problem, but this ‘otherness’.”15 Attitudinal perceptions of other human beings 
based on cultural variation and geopolitical factors that we perceive culminate in the fear 
mongering that causes the first stone to be cast. “What if in your own mind you do not 
                                                        
14 Interview with Dr. Goran Jovanovic of the International Institute of Geneva, Friday, September 
18, 2015. 
15 Interview with Dr. Jovanovic, September 18, 2015. 
 17 
define the other as your ‘hostis’, but your ‘frater’ or ‘soror’?”16 What if a more 
cosmopolitan culture17 could grow in place of the territorialized one in which we 
currently live? 
Of course disarmament critics would likely scoff at this idea, dismissing it as a 
utopian fantasy. To some extent, they would be absolutely right. There is no way to 
simply fiat the cultural and psychological shifts that would be necessary for some 
fantastical version of global peace to be achieved. Luckily, there is no need to for 
ludicrous fiat when the process of globalization is already cultivating a political and 
social climate the likes of which is slowly merging populations culturally.  
Youth growth and development is of particular importance to this process, as we 
see a general trend in liberalization as new generations mature and older generations fade. 
Youth citizenship today, more than historically seen, is of a transnational nature.18 In fact, 
“the notion of youth as unformed citizens is embedded in developmental assumptions 
about youth that actually tie youth culture […] to globalization.”19 As explained by Dr. 
Jovanovic, “globalization is a matrix of ideas” and these ideas socialize and educate 
populations in a generally constant direction.20 He specifically cited information 
technologies and communication leading to the establishment of the first realm defined 
by global citizenship, particularly among youth: the internet.  On the internet, there are no 
passports, no visas,  nor travel restrictions. It is a realm of equal opportunity and 
communication. When one connects to the internet, his or her geopolitical culture and 
                                                        
16 Interview with Dr. Jovanovic, September 18, 2015. 
17 Tomlinson, “Globalization and Culture.” 
18 Hörschelmann, “Transnational Citizenship, Dissent and the Political Geographies of Youth.” 
19 Orozco, “Globalization: Culture and Education in the New Millennium.” 
20 Interview with Dr. Jovanovic, September 18, 2015. 
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nationality are temporarily suspended, and he or she is assimilated into the singular, 
world culture.21 While this cultural homogenization takes place in a largely intangible 
realm, “a spillover effect from one dimension to the other” has already been seen, 
resulting in a “spiral of development rather than a linear one” in the tangible realm.22  
It is important to note that this process is not one that will likely yield results in 
years or decades, rather it is trans-generational.23 Even still, cultural homogenization is 
beginning to re-categorize foreign nationals in our minds. At an almost unrecognizably 
slow pace (such is the nature of worldwide cultural reformation) we are beginning to 
witness a unification, a homogenization of cultures that will combat traditional and 
historical conceptions of words like “foreign,” “other,” and “enemy.” These are the first 
steps toward a globalized, singular culture24 that homogenization promotes. 
 Granted, the digital aspect of this process meets challenges in censorship-prone 
states, and when there exists little access to free and unadulterated information 
technologies. Very necessary players to the nuclear disarmament process are among the 
states lagging behind in the allowance of free-flowing information, North Korea being a 
prime example. However, if recent history is any indicator, we can see that radical 
grassroots movements can transform a state and result in spontaneous leaps in 
globalization. The Arab Spring illustrated this process of minor participation in the global 
conversation suddenly exploding into massive movements, fuelled largely by globalized 
communication, and culminating in geopolitical transformations.  
                                                        
21 Kirby, “Sociology in Perspective,” p. 407-408. 
22 Interview with Dr. Jovanovic, September 18, 2015. 
23 Interview with Dr. Jovanovic, September 18, 2015. 
24 Jennings, “Globalizations and the Ancient World,” p. 132. 
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“It takes time for global citizenship or consciousness to emerge, but it is 
happening.”25 Once cultures have homogenized to such an extent that nationalistic great-
power paranoia and hostilities are no longer majority perceptions, we may socially evolve 
into the circumstances necessary for nuclear disarmament to become less of a fantasy, 
and more a demand of every voice. 
 
International Norm Development 
 Somewhat related to the discussion of cultural homogenization, but distinct in an 
important way, is the spread of norms and the diffusion of beliefs encouraged by 
globalization. I am no longer referencing the blurring of national identity or 
psychological reformation of the “us versus them” paradigms under which we currently 
live. Rather than discussing a homogenization of identity, I will now concentrate on the 
process of homogenizing norms, even in a world in which national identities and 
“enemy” rhetoric still exist.  
Even within distinct societies with distinct cultural identities, globalization helps 
to facilitate the spread of norms and the establishment of “universally held” beliefs. 
Sovereign security obligations and the continuation of hostile foreign perceptions are not 
mutually exclusive to international norm building efforts that could delegitimize nuclear 
weapons to such an extent as to persuade disarmament. As explained by Dr. John Borrie 
of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), “a lot of the 
behavior of states seems not to be driven by this Melian dialogue style, rationalist-
materialist logic that the powerful do what they want and the rest of us do what we must. 
                                                        
25 Interview with Dr. Marc Finaud of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Thursday, October 
28, 2015. 
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A logic of appropriateness actually applies to a lot of behavior and often states act in 
ways that reflect a belief that the opinions of others matter. That’s the leverage that the 
nuclear disarmament movement has.”26  
Despite the circular debate that justifies continued and necessary possession of 
nuclear weapons by states, disarmament as a terminal condition is certainly not 
impossible so long as those in power are susceptible to normative social pressures. The 
success of the Ottawa Treaty in the banning of anti-personnel mines represents a great 
victory for campaigners utilizing norm-building strategies to motivate changes in great 
power behavior. While the United States has yet to sign the treaty, it has still been 
pressured to abide by the treaty’s terms. This proves “that we can affect the actions of 
even the most powerful by establishing a clear standard for what’s considered acceptable 
and unacceptable.”27 The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is a second prime 
example of a norm building initiative. While a handful of great powers are not yet 
member to the CCM, it has put pressure on possessors of cluster munitions, burdening 
them with international scrutiny and necessitating that additional evaluation and thought 
be put into the continued possession and use of these arms.  
Norm building is not restricted by the sorts of trans-generational evolutionary 
timelines as are processes of cultural homogenization. In fact, Dr. Borrie of UNIDIR 
explained that he certainly has not “seen the emergence of some global class of people 
who consider themselves global citizens” (the hopeful, yet ambitious end-goal of 
transnational identity shifts and cultural homogenization). However, “if you look at the 
evolution of [norm building] campaigns, new technologies that we associate with 
                                                        
26 Interview with Dr. Borrie, Thursday, November 5, 2015. 
27 Interview with Dr. Borrie, Thursday, November 5, 2015. 
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globalization have made them more agile,”28 and there are empirical success stories 
including those discussed previously. 
While Dr. Borrie, among others, does not believe that globalization “necessarily 
make[s] a decisive difference to disarmament,”29 it seems evident that at least some 
indirect relationship exists between the international phenomenon and disarmament 
initiatives. If only for its ameliorating of the coordination and collective action problems 
that plague social movements and campaigns, globalization is influencing the efficacy of 
disarmament efforts. Non-nuclear actors by definition are less powerful than nuclear 
weapon-armed actors. A pro-disarmament collective voice is necessary to narrow the 
power disparity, and globalization is necessary to this collectivization. In a similar 
fashion as cultural homogenization, if a bit faster, with time will come unification, and 
with unification will come the delegitimization necessary to prompt nuclear weapon state 
(NWS) support. 
 
Cooperative Security Architecture 
 In the status quo, security frameworks are exceedingly reliant on nuclear 
deterrents and national priorities. While nuclear weapon states are certainly dependent on 
these frameworks, those with security guarantees under one nuclear umbrella or another 
also have vested interests in their preservation. Despite these narrowly focused security 
objectives, in truth, “there is no such thing as national security, there is only international 
or collective security. The alternative is collective insecurity.”30  
                                                        
28 Interview with Dr. Borrie, Thursday, November 5, 2015. 
29 Interview with Dr. Borrie, Thursday, November 5, 2015. 
30 Doyle, “Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?” p. 25. 
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In a world in which disarmament is imminent as a result of evolving international 
relationships, erecting a new security doctrine to replace the old will be essential, and “as 
a prerequisite […] we will have to see a transition to collective and globalized power.”31 
In whisperingly subtle ways, this transition has already begun, and is helping to usher in 
the new doctrine and guide its construction on the foundations of international 
organizations that operate today.  
Dr. Marc Finaud of the Geneva Centre for Security policy explained that “a new 
paradigm should […] reconcile nuclear powers’ security doctrines with global aspirations 
for a safer world, and ensure that nuclear powers derive their security less from others’ 
insecurity but from mutually beneficial cooperative security.”32 In this way, a transition 
away from the fear tactics referenced by Winston Churchill in 1955 could occur. 
Neorealist concerns within a system of collectivization of security interests and dispute 
settlement will likely revolve around the loss of relative power advantage over 
competitors. However, if the smallest unit of measurement for populations in need of 
security were to be all humans rather than exclusively the humans living within a 
particular geopolitical swath of land, then these relative power disparities would matter 
much less.  
This argument goes back to the discussion of cultural homogenization and 
transnational identities, and I am fully aware that it is starkly contrary to the power 
politics that have dominated international discussions for decades. Yes, the zero-sum 
paradigm of relative power relations is well established in the status quo; its roots have 
dug deep psychologically as well as in regard to investment and infrastructure. However, 
                                                        
31 Interview with Dr. Finaud, Thursday, October 28, 2015. 
32 Interview with Dr. Finaud, Thursday, October 28, 2015. 
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“globalization and subsequent reductions in nationalism can make domestic barriers to 
disarmament less difficult to overcome,” particularly when new “mechanisms, 
negotiations, and security architectures”33 are brought to fruition to fill the void that 
nuclear technologies will leave behind upon their departure. In order to make greater the 
likelihood of success, new collective security architecture must accompany cultural 
homogenization, and vice versa. If one of the two components is missing from the 
equation, the other will be unlikely to function properly. 
Globalization has already begun to roughly form institutions in which collective 
security architectures may grow and flourish. It “is happening in a creeping way that we 
don’t necessarily realize,” and  “if you compare the current US strategy with the previous 
one, already we see some change.” The strategies (multilateral sanctions, joint pressures, 
etc.) that helped to pave the way for the Iran Nuclear Deal, as well as the deal itself, 
illustrate ways in which security architecture in the status quo has already begun to shift 
away from the less collective and more violent architectures of the past. In reference to 
the deal, Dr. Finaud of GCSP said, “it may be minute, but if the most powerful nuclear 
state in the world is increasing reliance on alternative instruments and responses to 
conflict, you have a shift.”34 The alternative instruments to which he referenced include 
negotiations, sanctions, and multilateral consultations, among others. By increasing 
investment and effort allocated to these alternative and globalized dispute settlement 
tools and by contributing to the strengthening of the globalized institutions that make 
them effective, the status quo will see the transition in security architecture necessary to 
                                                        
33 Interview with Dr. Finaud, Thursday, October 28, 2015. 
34 Interview with Dr. Finaud, Thursday, October 28, 2015. 
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break the paradox of deterrence theory and phase out nuclear weapons in a safe, 
controlled manner. 
 
Criticism and Status Quo Infeasibility 
 Of course, while transnational identity shifts, evolving international norms, and 
recent trends toward collective security architecture are representative of baby-steps 
toward a potential future devoid of nuclear-armed actors, critics are certainly not in short 
supply. Not all of these critics are necessarily opposed to the idea of definitive nuclear 
disarmament (some are) rather, they claim to represent a pragmatism that educates us on 
the impossibility of such a goal.  
 “Rationality” is a very tricky word when it comes to both the possession of 
nuclear weapons and the potential for disarmament. Deterrence theorists would claim that 
the rationality of nuclear actors ensures the unlikelihood of a nuclear first-strike because 
of an understanding of the implications. Humanitarians would claim that rationality 
should motivate disarmament because of an understanding of the potential for 
miscalculation and accidents, among other risks. Still others argue claim that nuclear 
disarmament is entirely unfeasible because of the rationality of sovereign populations and 
of political actors that govern them. The word is tooled by each distinct party to the 
debate, making it difficult to discern what truly is the rational course of action. 
 As explained by Dr. Vautravers of the Swiss Military Review, the Geneva Centre 
for Strategic Studies, and the University of Geneva, “The U.K. considers itself to have 
the fourth most effective armed forces. If it loses nuclear weapons […] it does not fall to 
6 or 7, it probably falls to number 14, or worse. An ordinary citizen in the UK is not 
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prepared to say, ‘oh yes, we don’t mind going from number 4 to number 14.’”35 The 
leaderboard of military capability is extremely interconnected with ideals of national 
identity, Dr. Vautravers continued. Advocacy for disarmament in the United Kingdom 
would be akin to advocacy for the abolition of the U.K. university system or advocacy for 
the discontinuation of the brain drain.36  
As a “rational” population that wishes to maintain relatively meaningful military 
capabilities, it simply would not make sense for British citizens to support a disarmament 
initiative. The nature of military strength that is directly proportional to nuclear weapon 
capabilities is a particularly daunting barrier in democratic nuclear weapon states. The 
accountability of government to these “rational” citizenries, whose identities and 
perceptions of security depend on nuclear weapons, prevents the serious consideration of 
any disarmament initiative. 
“Rational” anticipation of governments and politicians results in much the same 
lack of genuine consideration for disarmament efforts. Because of democratic 
accountability, no rational political actor would advocate for such a vastly unpopular 
initiative. Setting aside for a moment the entire debate on miscalculation/accident risks, 
deterrence theory, nuclear umbrellas, and all else, perceptions held by populations within 
democracies and subsequent platform alignments geared toward political self-
preservation make impossible achieving nuclear disarmament as an end state. In context 
with the status quo from which globalization is facilitating our departure, Dr. Vautravers 
                                                        
35 Interview with Dr. Alexandre Vautravers of the Swiss Military Review, Geneva Centre for 
Security Policy, and University of Geneva, Thursday, November 5, 2015. 
36 Interview with Dr. Vautravers, Thursday, November 5, 2015. 
 26 
explained that “the global zero initiative is a failure, it’s ridiculous. We know where it 
comes from, but it’s not on the table.”37  
Absolutely, barriers such as these stop disarmament initiatives dead in their tracks 
given current political climates. However, if processes of globalization continue to 
homogenize diverse populations, foster widely and deeply supported anti-nuclear norms, 
and provide a new security architecture to which states may transition, current barriers 
could be entirely redressed from the ground up. The grievance of citizenries could 
effectually be turned on its head. The rationality of political actors, then, would motivate 
support for the pursuit of a global zero. 
Conclusion 
 Globalization is a complex and multi-faceted organism. Its worldwide 
implications include those of a social, economic, cultural, and political nature. Nuclear 
weapon technologies are comparably impactful. Status quo scholars and activists with 
nuclear weapon expertise will be among the first to explain that the social and cultural 
controversy surrounding these technologies shrouds their future in uncertainty. In a 
paradoxical fashion, rationality is touted both as a justification for advocacy for these 
weapons, and as a justification for their dismantlement. In short, we find ourselves today 
trying to traverse a “rock and a hard place” debate, with no way to accommodate the 
imperatives demanded by the multiple juxtaposed camps. 
 Disarmament critics are right; we have not yet reached a turning point at which a 
global zero initiative is in any form feasible. This is certainly disheartening, particularly 
                                                        
37 Interview with Dr. Vautravers, Thursday, November 5, 2015. 
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given the world’s precarious position on the edge of the nuclear knife that defines status 
quo security architecture. However, there is certainly hope.  
 Borne of globalization, a trifecta of transformations will soon change the rules by 
which the disarmament game is played. As mentioned heretofore, globalization and 
subsequent processes are of human origin, but are neither of conscious human design nor 
are they under conscious human control. As a result, the perfect predictability of the 
speed at which they will effect tangible change is nigh impossible.  
 More definitive, however, are the ways by which these processes will help to 
facilitate nuclear arms reductions and an eventual global zero. This is the world I see: As 
transnational identities grow more numerous and cultures homogenize with increasing 
rapidity, Westphalian sovereignty and the need to securitize in a starkly geopolitical 
sense will lose relevance. Evolving international norms and “logics of appropriateness” 
will catalyze a new, systematic necessity to disarmament. Finally, the collectivization of 
security will ensure a smooth transition from the old defense paradigm to the new, one 
devoid of nuclear weapons and all the more stable as a result.  
 The status quo is hostile to idea of this sequence of events. Those of a more 
traditional adherence use “unrealistic,” or “borderline utopian” to describe it. However, 
idealism is just that until it is realized. The status quo is beginning to see the first hints of 
this process’ realization, and the subtleties of globalization will be culprits to the creation 
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